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ABSTRACT
Until 2004, the K Basins at Hanford, in southeastern
Washington State, held the largest collection of spent nuclear
fuel in the United States Department of Energy (DOE)
complex. The K East and K West Basins are massive pools -
each holding more than 4 million liters of water - that sit less
than 450 meters from the Columbia River. In a significant
multi-year campaign that ended in 2004, Fluor Hanford
removed all of the fuel from the two Basins, over 2,300 metric
tons (4.6 million pounds), dried it, and then placed it into dry
storage in a specially designed facility away from the River•.
Removing the fuel, however, did not finish the cleanup
work at the K Basins. The years of underwater storage had
corroded the metallic uranium fuel, leaving behind a thick and
sometimes hard-packed layer of sludge that coated the walls,
floors and equipment inside the Basins. In places, the depth of
the sludge was measured in feet rather than inches, and its
composition was definitely not uniform. Together the Basins
held an estimated 50 cubic meters ofsludge (42 cubic meters in
K East and 8 cubic meters in K West). The K East sludge
retrieval and transfer work was completed in May 2007.
Vacuuming up the sludge into large underwater containers
in each of the Basins and then consolidating it all in containers
in the K West Basin have presented significant challenges,
some unexpected. This paper documents some of those
challenges and presents the lessons learned so that other nuclear.
cleanup projects can benefit from the experience at Hanford.
I
INTRODUCTION
The K Basins are two 4 million liter concrete pools that
were built to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel from former
plutonium production reactors, The Basins are indoor, concrete
rectangular pools 38 meters by 20 meters, and are located about
56 kilometers north of Richland, Washington, on the DOE's
Hanford Site. They sit less than 450 meters from the Columbia
River.
Until 2004, the K Basins held the largest collection of
spent nuclear fuel in the United States Department of Energy
(DOE) complex, over 1.8E6 TBq (50 million curies) of
radioactivity. Removal of over 100,000 fuel elements was
safely completed in late 2004. The 2,100 metric tons (4.6
million pounds) of fuel were placed into dry storage. Fluor
then turned its focus on the remaining sludge.
However, removing the fuel did not finish the cleanup
work at the K Basins. Years of underwater storage corroded
the fuel, leaving behind radioactive sludge that was a mixture
of windblown sand, fuel-corrosion products, spalled concrete,
rocks, work debris, metal rack and storage canister corrosion
products, and ion-exchange resin beads. In addition, the fuel-
cleaning process itself generated sludge that had concentrated
radionuclides.
An estimated 50 cubic meters of sludge were contained in
the Basins (42 m' in K East and 8 m' in K West). Sludge
retrieval began in K East in October 2004 and was completed in
October 2006. Sludge transfer from K East to K West began in
November 2006 and was completed in May 2007. Sludge
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retrieval is in process at K West and will be completed by
January 2008.
NOMENCLATURE
DOE United States, Department ofEnergy
Hill Hose-in-hose
KDC K Basins Closure
TDq TeraBequerels
UT Ultrasonic Test
Retrieval and transfer of the K East sludge provided many
valuable lessons. Fluor and its subcontractors, with support and
participation by the DOE customer, conducted several formal
and informal lesson learned sessions. Discussed below are
several of the key lessons learned.
Fast track project caused less than adequate planning
and estimating
Erosion testing, contingency planning and erosion
monitoring provided much needed operational
lIexibility
Pump fouling _resulted from less than adequate
clearances for the maximum particle size
Dilution and mobilization of the sludge was more of
a technical challenge than anticipated
Schedule recovery efforts were effective at
mitigating delays caused by technical issues
The original scope for the K Basins Sludge Project was to
design and fabricate a retrieval and storage system to retrieve
sludge from the K Basins and package it in containers that
would be stored at lIanford's T Plant for later treatment (-2015
time period). Originally, the treatment of the SO cubic meters
of sludge was planned to be encompassed within the treatment
of over 2000 cubic meters of other Hanford waste. Thus, the K
Basins Project competitively sought and awarded in October
2003, a contract to design and fabricate the Sludge Retrieval
and Storage Systein. This contract was for the design of a
system to retrieve K East and K West sludge into Large
Diameter Containers for shipment and interim storage at T
Plant for later treatment.
Simultaneously, DOE performed a review of the T Plant
facility for this work. Based on that review, DOE urged that the
sludge be handled only once and be treated sooner rather than
later. DOE also questioned the use of the aging T Plant facility
for this new mission. In response to the DOE's request, Fluor
embarked on a revised plan to only send the low radioactivity
sludge (about 4-6 cubic meters of sludge in the North Load Pit
area of K East) to T Plant for direct grouting (no oxidation of
uranium metal). For the remaining sludge, Fluor and DOE
decided to consolidate the remaining sludge underwater in the
K West basin (one kilometer away from the K East Basin) for
later treatment.
The K West Basin was selected to receive the sludge since
the basin was never known to have leaked The K East Basin
had leaked millions of gallons of contaminated basin water to
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the underlying soil in the early 1980s and early 1990s. This
made it a priority to empty the K East Basin, demolish the basin
and begin remediation of the underlying contaminated soil.
Fluor began to evaluate three options to transfer the sludge
from the K East Basin to the K West Basin. The three options
considered were:
I. Transfer the sludge in small rectangular boxes
(about 0.5 cubic meters in size) inside the already
designed and built fuel transfer cask.
2. Transfer -the sludge via dilute slurry and pumping
through a hose-in-hose (Hill) pipeline.
3. Pump the sludge into larger containers at KEast
and transfer in a special transfer cask.
Fluor chose option two due to the following major factors:
I. The HiH technology was being used on the
lIanford Site for transfer of High Level Tank-
Waste and was accepted by the DOE customer
and regulators.
2. A substantial amount of nuclear safety analysis
foundation existed from the tank waste nuclear
safety basis.
3. Pumping operations were expected to be the least
labor intensive methodof transfer
During this evaluation and selection process, design was
proceeding on the retrieval system and Large Diameter
Containers. By December 2003, Fluor had briefed DOE on the
options and was moving toward option two. In January 2004,
- the subcontractor delivered an informal design of the original
design, minus the T·Plant portion. In March 2004, Fluor
revised the SOW by adding the K East to K West Basins sludge
transfer system scope using Hlll design and to provide a
preliminary study on sludge treatment options. Since the 60%
informal design-review deliverable for the balance of the
original contract scope had been submitted, Fluor and
subcontractor agreed that the 1I111 design would only be
subjected to a 30% and 90% design review.
A new project plan (baseline), shifting the project to
Option 2, was developed from January to May 2004. In
parallel, Fluor began to modify the subcontract to build
containers and transport the sludge to T Plant. It was
systematically modified to be a subcontract to transfer the
sludge to the K West basin via lIi1l.
Schedule pressure caused less than adequate planning
during the baseline update in May 2004. Optimistic dates were
chosen and little or no contingency was built into the new plan.
This created what is referred to as a fast-track project. Fast
tracking, combined with midstream, wholesale modification of
the design contract from Large Diameter Containers to a Hill
system set the stage for numerous project pitfalls.
Needless to say, there were significant scope changes
before the 100% design was issued. More than 30 technical
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changes to the contract and three revisions to the statement of
work were issued.
The subcontractor awarded a sole-source subcontract to
fabricate portions of the Hill equipment in July 2004. Fluor
received the 90% design deliverables in August 2004, after
which the fabricator started planning and material purchases
using the 90% design documents. The review by Fluor
personnel generated many comments. Obviously, the design
changes occurring due to the shift in strategy and subcontract
modifications were too much for the change control process to
handle. Based on the extent of 90% comments, there were
significant changes between the 90% and 100% documents,
resulting in major changes in fabrication of the equipment,
using 100% design documents. Cost over runs and schedule
delays began to develop. This situation continued to
deteriorate. The fabricator had numerous questions on
drawings that were not complete. Meanwhile the designer was
still redlining and changing drawings to reflect design changes
and Fluor comments. This was further exacerbated by the
results of erosion testing.
Due to concerns over potential erosion of the flexible hose
by the abrasive sludge traveling at fairly high velocities (14-16
feet per second), the subcontractor commissioned a test of the
hose. In September 2004, erosion testing demonstrated that the
steel braided, EPDM rubber hose withstood the erosion very
well. However, the test pump failed due to erosion after only
eight hours of pumping. This situation raised concerns over
excessive erosion of the pump that was intended for the booster
pump station of the I/IH transfer lines.
Fluor corporate technical experts recommended the design
be modified to use a positive displacement slurry pump to solve
the erosion issue. The lead time to procure the desired positive
displacement pump was nearly 18 months. There were other
disadvantages of the positive displacement pump. Specifically,
the high discharge pressure would cause a large jump in the
quality and cost of the transfer hoses. Secondly, the high
discharge pressure made the spray release accident scenario
significantly worse. Due to the fast track nature of the project,
and the two issues discussed above, less than adequate time was
available to procure the best suited pump. The fast-track
schedule allowed less than one year for equipment
procurement, fabrication, installation, testing and start up.
Fluor and the subcontractor jointly decided to minimize
schedule impact, and use a modified centrifugal pump. A new
test pump constructed with duplex stainless steel was tested
with sludge stimulant. The test results indicated that pump had
much higher resistance to erosion. However, the test data
predicted the pump would approach minimum wall thickness
by the end of the project. Functional design criteria for the
pumping system required a safety margin of two times design
life. Based on this a second pump was required to be added to
each of four booster stations. This installed spare could then be
valved in rapidly if the primary pump approached minimum
wall thickness (Figure I). This also drove the need for installed
ultrasonic (UT) probes on the eight pumps in those areas where
wear was expected to be high. The addition of the second
pump in each booster station, as well as the UT measurement
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equipment, caused another perturbation in the design and major
fabrication changes. Cost increases and schedule de lays
continued to climb.
In late May 2005 Fluor stopped funding the de sign
subcontract and closed out the HIlI contract and assumed all
subcontracts due to continued issues with cost and sc hedule
performance. To minimize further cost overruns, Fluor
accelerated reviews of final fabrication data packages and in
some instances took over minor remaining fabrication work in
order to have all of the equipment delivered in July 2005 for
installation.
Figure I - Sludge Transfer Booster Station (one of four)
Based on this and other DOE projects, new DOE
leadership decided that fast-track projects, especially for highly
complex, first-of-a-kind projects like the K Basins sludge
project, were not how DOE wanted to do business. Thus, in the
fall of2005, DOE and Fluor decided to re-baseline this project.
Fluor performed a robust risk evaluation on all remaining
portions of this project using Fluor's Business Risk
Management Framework (BRMF) tools. A revised baseline
that contained a detailed risk mitigation plan and cost and
schedule contingency was delivered to DOE in November
2005. Equipment installation occurred from July 2005 to the
summer of 2006. Testing and startup were completed by
October 2006 and transfer of the sludge occurred from
November 2006 through May 2007. After completion of this
new baseline, technical challenges continued to arise; however,
through the use of risk mitigation plans and contingency
funding in the new baseline, the project was completed by the
legal and contractual deadline of May 31, 2007. The lesson
learned is to avoid fast-track projects, especially when they are
complex and first-of-a-kind. Also, to avoid major shifts in
technical approaches late in the planning cycle without adding
adequate time for replanning and rebaselining.
The second major lesson learned was that good erosion
testing, contingency planning and erosion monitoring provided
much needed operational flexibility. Erosion testing indicated
that the transfer pump would just reach minimum wall
thickness at the end of the expected duty cycle. A safety factor
of two was required by the Fluor pumping system design
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specification. TIlls led to the decision to install a spare booster
pump in each booster station and to allow it to be valved in
from outside the booster station enclosure. The enclosure
provides spray tightness in the case of an unexpected leak or
rupture disk over pressurizat ion (see Figure I). The project
also decided to install ultrasonic (UT) probes on the eight
pumps in those areas where wear was expected to be high. The
addition of the UT sensors would allow on line monitoring of
pump wall thickness to ensure field performance was consistent
with test results and to ensure the shift to the spare pump
occurred prior to reaching the minimum allowed wall thickness.
TIlls contingency planning proved invaluable. The primary
booster pump in Booster Station #2 was taken off line due to
vibration and the secondary pump was placed in service early
in the project. Thus the contingency to have a second pump for
erosion protection saved the project when pump vibration arose
as a technical issue. Now making this secondary pump last the
life of the project without approaching minimum wall thickness
was a challenge. While Booster Station #2 was open for
inspec tion, additional UT measurements were taken to confirm
that the location of the four installed UT probes did in fact
represent the location of maximum erosion (which was
determined in the earlier erosion tests). TIlls revealed that there
were severa l locations that exhibited higher wear than the
installed probes. These locations appeared to coincide with the
heat affected zone (HAZ) of the discharge nozzle. The base
metal and weld filler erosio n was low; but, the HAZ erosion
was higher. This is cons istent with pred icted behavior for
duplex stainless steel when higher heat is applied during
welding. Three additional UT probes were mounted on the
booster pumps to add these new areas to the monitoring scheme
for a total of seve n UT probes per pump housing (Figure 2).
Figure 2 - Additional Ultrasonic Probes on Booster Pump
Monitoring procedures were changed to increase the
frequency of monitoring. In the end, all pumps lasted to
completion without reaching the allowed minimum wall
thickness.
The lesson learned is that without the spare pumps the
project would have taken a large delay. Without the UT probes
and wall thickness monitoring, Fluor and the DOE customer
would not have had the confidence in the pumps integrity to run
4
to completion. Erosio n rates were very close to that predicted
by the testing program. The location of highest erosion varied
slightly due to differences in the geometry and fabrication of
the production pump compared to the test pump. Erosion was
consistent between all production pumps indicating that
geometry and fabrication techniques are co nsistent eno ugh in
production pumps to have little effect on eros ion rates.
The third major lesson learned stemmed from the last
minute changes in design to the centrifugal pumps used in the
booster stations. Recall that the redesigned test pump
manufactured from duplex stainle ss steel withstood erosion
fairly well. The test pump was a smaller scale version of the
pump with lower head requirements . Eight large pumps were
ordered (two per booster station) with the same velocity
requirement but higher discharge head. The specification
required that the pump be able to pump sludge particles up to Y.
inch in diameter. Shortly after startup of the HiH system and
before a significant amount of sludge was transferred, the
primary pump in one booster station began to show excessive
vibration. Detailed inspections of mountings, balance and a
fiber-optic inspection of the internals was conducted. These
inspections revealed that a bridge of deposits had formed
between two vanes of the impeller (Figure 3). Additionally, the
back side of each impeller blade had a build up ofdeposits over
a short distance about three fourths of the way to the outer
radius (Figure 4). This buildup appeared to be fairly uniform
when comparing the five impeller blades.
Figure 3 - Sludge Deposits Bridging Two Impeller Vanes
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Figure 4 - Uniform Sludge Depo sits on Back oflmpeller
Blade
In order to troub leshoot this problem, Fluor requested the pump
vendor's proprietary drawings of the pump impe ller. Upon
receipt of these drawi ngs, Fluor leamed that the impe ller
clearance was only one quarter inch, not the 3/8 - 3/4 inch that
would be expec ted for a slurry pump designed for up to 1/4
inch particles. Discussion with the vendor indicated that the
clearance was reduced in order to add 1/8 inch wiper vanes on
the back of the impeller. Fluor also learned that the impeller
vane s had been signifi cantly lengthen ed and flattened by the
vendor when compare d to the test pump. Th e pump vendor
based this on bis model to crea te the needed discharge head.
Fluor commiss ioned finite element modeling of the existing
impeller and predicted the flow vectors on the impeller blades.
The finite elemen t modeling confirmed the prediction that
tangential veloci ties went to zero on the backside of the
impeller blade. Thi s appea red to explain the uni form deposits
on the back side of the vanes; however, the uniform deposits
were not likely the cause of the vibration. Th e brid ge between
two van es was the likely initiator of the vibration. Fluor
speculated that this bridge was likely caused by one or two
particles of approximately 1/4 inch size jamming between the
impeller blades, pot entially aided by the deposit buildup on the
impeller back side. Once a particle jammed, other part icles
began to dam up behind this and caused the bridge.
Additionally, early sludge transfers were plagued by
"s lugg ing". Sluggi ng occurred when a large slug of sludge
overwhe lmed the dilution contro ller and put a "s lug" of sludge
mto the transfer line. Th e resulting pressure transi ent often
tripped the pumps off on pressure prot ection interlocks that
were built into the system to protect against this predicted
event. In respon se to this discovery, Fluor put the following
corrective actions in place:
1. A new impeller was designed that eliminated the
low flow regi me and opened up the impeller
clea rances to be consis tent with commo n slurry
pump clearance des ign guidance.
2. The spare pump was placed in service in the
booster statio n with the fouled pump.
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3. A new strainer was placed upstream of the booster
stat ions to screen the sludge through a 3/16 inch
screen. This would restore adequate clearance in
the existing pumps.
4. Replacement pumps were ordered in case the new
strainer failed to protect the remaining pumps.
Whol esale pump replacement would be much
easier than replacement of an impeller in a higbly
contaminated pump (dose readings inside the pump
were appro ximately 3-5 remlbour when the pump
fouled). The first new pump was not expected for
five to seve n weeks.
5. Repl acement impellers were ordered since the lead
time was fairly shor t (two weeks). This was a
backup plan if the o ther pumps fouled in the next
five weeks.
6. Vibration monitoring frequency was increased and
action setpoints were established for increasing
vib rat ion (>0.28 inches/s econd RMS dennanded
increased monitoring as long as vibration was
increasi ng. >0.48 inches/second required pump
shutdown) .
7. Dilution control changes were implemented. This
included physical system modifications as well as
software settings and procedures.
The shutdown to investigate this problem and putting the ab ove
actions in place caused a loss in schedule of one full month.
Replacement impellers and pumps were received but were
never needed. The revis ed dilut ion control scheme greatly
reduced the number of slugg ing events and pressure trips . This
reduced the likelihood of heav y concentrations of sludge in the
impellers and thus the likelihood of foul ing. The reduced
maximum particle size in the system due to the new strainer is
also atrributed with the protection of the remaining pumps .
The lesson learned in this case is to more closely monitor
and inspect the work of vendors. Do not trus t that they will
adequately modi fy or sca le up equipment based on their
assumed expertise in their line of business. Consider fun scale
testing for complex projects, especiall y when equipment
replacement and maintenance arc so difficult due to high
radiation fields.
The fourth major lesson learned was that Dilution and
mobiliza tion of the sludge was more of a technical cha llenge
than anticipated . The dilution scheme consisted of:
1. A suctio n pipe from the tank at the bottom of the
sloping portion of the tank
2. Insid e the tank, a resuspension di lution lance that
pro vided variable flow of sludge-free water close to
the tank outlet
3. Out side the tank , dilution water inlet connec tion to
inje ct sludge-free water in the pump suc tion,
upstream of the dilution control valve
4. A dilution controlle r measuring suspended solids
and controlling dilut ion wate r flow
Slurry content at the first pump (and hence downstream) was
controlled by adjusting the dilution water ra te.
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Early operations were plagued by inconsistent slurry
concentration and system trips on pump suction or discharge
pressure interlocks. Fluor determined that the dilution issues
stemmed either from deviations from the original design or
weaknesses in the initial design. One dcviation was the
position of the suction pipe dilution water inlet. It was moved
further from the tank outlet during system installation due to
operation efficiencies that would be gained when switching the
pumping hardware from tank suction to tank suction (sludge
was stored in four underwater tanks in K East that were
pumped in series). This condition was corrected and dilution .
control improved "but was not solved. The second deviation
occurred in the height of the resuspension dilution lance inside
the tank. The lances were installed several inches too high due
100 integration of the design of the deck grating penetration
collars (provided by Fluor) and the lances (provided by
subcontract). The lances were lowered and dilution control
improved further. Additionally, the dilution control valve was
being overdriven in the closed direction by approximately 10%.
Over time, this caused the valve operator to slip on the valve
drive shaft. Investigation revealed that the input signal to the
dilution control valve needed to be limited to prevent
overdriving the valve operator.
The operability of the suspended solids .meter and
instrument control loop were also weak and needed software
adjustments, timing changes and procedure modifications to
tune the dilution control system performance. Once these
system adjustments were completed, dilution control improved
dramatically and slugging and pressure transients and system
trips were reduced dramatically. Fewer slugs of sludge being
sent into the pumps and the smaller maximum particle size
resulting from the new strainer basket helped protect the pumps
from fouling. Vibration problems were mitigated and
controlled by these changes.
The lesson learned is that the design performance can be
quickly lost, with significant consequences, due to small and
innocent modifications. Expected schedule improvements
resulting from the modifications can be completely erased by
degraded system performance. Design changes resulting from
less than adequate integration of facility modifications and
installed equipment modifications need to be avoided via
interface control documents. Any system that relies on a
feedback loop will require some fine tuning and period of time
to find the proper settings to avoid hunting.. Lastly, when
mobilizing heterogeneous sludge, consideration should be made
for a stirrer or recirculation loop to achieve a more dilute and
constant suspended solids concentration.
all the actions and contingencies that Fluor would pursue to
recover lost schedule. The recovery plan included numerous
actions. A few of the more important actions were:
I. Establishment of a multidisciplined ''war room" team,
manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week to keep
work planning, implementation of improvements,
development of contingency plans, procurement of
spares, etc, well ahead of the operational effort. The
team included a senior manager who could exercise
influence to spur action. The goal was to ensure that
paperwork and parts were never causing a delay. This
was quite effective. Dozens of contingency work
packages were generated and waiting on the shelf in
case of further equipment failure. Some were used,
many were not. Those that were used saved many
days of further delay.
2. Procurement ofspares
3. Twice daily teleconferences between the war room
project staff, functional support organizations (e.g.
procurement) and the DOE customer.
4. Assignment of expediters to ensure spare parts were
delivered and received quickly.
5. Transfer of larger particle sludge caught in the
strainers by fuel transfer cask
These actions, coupled with numerous other recovery plan
actions, recovered more than 14 days on the critical path and
allowed the project to complete by the May 31, 2007
legaVregulatory milestone. The recovery efforts were
supported well by Fluor senior management and DOE.
Recovery plans, when well planned and executed, can
dramatically improve performance and recover lost schedule
"time. Despite numerous technical hurdles, the project
personnel persevered and achieved the desired result.
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The last major lesson stemmed from the recovery effort
needed to mitigate the delays caused by-early problems with
dilution control, slugging, pressure transients, pump trips,
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the added vibration and UT monitoring that resulted from the
investigation and repair. In February, Fluor delivered a new
working schedule to DOE that forecast a June 14 completion.
This would be 14 days later than the May 31 legal and
regnlatory deadline for completing this work. At the same
time, Fluor delivered a recovery plan to DOE that established
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